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Are lending contracts between international financial institutions (IFIs) and sovereign borrowers 
optimal? To address this question this paper builds on two ideas. First, the prospect  of future 
debt relief can make it profitable for an IFI to continue lending even if lending contracts are 
currently violated.  Second, some policy makers may prefer not implement reform contracts, 
and this preference remains unobserved to the IFI. Hence, some governments may strategically 
implement contracts in order to accumulate debt. When the debt stock becomes sufficiently 
large, it can be used as an “hold up” instrument, enabling the government to implement its 
preferred policy, assured that lending will continue.  To mitigate the risk of “hold up”, the  IFI 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
“Some twenty-five countries have been indebted to the Fund for more than thirty years out of 
the last fifty. Sixteen countries have been under Fund-supported programs for twelve years 
or more out of the last eighteen. Such prolonged use risks turning the Fund into a source of 
long term financing, in contradiction with the mandate set forth in its Articles of Agreement. 
Many of the countries have acute debt sustainability problems and most are now enrolled in 
the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) initiative” –Independent Evaluation Office  
(IEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2002 
  
Lending by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and the World 
Bank (WB) have been frequently linked to unsustainable debt burdens and little sustained 
policy reform (Easterly [2001 a, b] and Boone [1995, 1996]). Both the amount of resources 
involved, and the social costs from misallocating those resources across and within borrower 
countries are substantial. For example, as the excerpt above notes, in recognition of their 
repayment difficulties, about $US50 billion in debt forgiveness have been provided to many 
long term IFI borrowers thus far, and several more countries are expected to become eligible 
for similar relief in the coming years
2.  Despite the magnitude of resources involved, much 
remains to be understood about why IFI lending is often associated with  acute debt  
unsustainability in many borrowing countries. Are IFI lending contracts optimal? How does 
the possibility of future debt relief affect the composition and enforcement of these 
contracts? And when do borrowers chose to abide by lending contracts?     
  
In addressing these questions, this paper  builds on the idea that like most banking 
relationships, asymmetric information plays a key role in the interaction between IFIs and 
sovereign borrowers.  To motivate the discussion, the argument emphasizes  the case where 
the sovereign borrower is better informed about its preference for reform than the IFI, and 
this policy choice determines whether loans can be repaid. But unlike most private banking 
relationships, collateral requirements, co signers and the other contractual methods of 
mitigating repayment risk
3 are unavailable in contracts that involve sovereign borrowers
4 and 
IFIs. Instead, these contracts are usually characterized by an initial disbursement of funds 
from the IFI in return for a borrower promise to realize some contracted policy outcome or 
“reform”—ex-post conditionality. Often underlying these arrangements is the implicit notion 
                                                 
2 See for example the IMF fact sheet on debt relief:  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. 
3 (Besanko and Tharkor [1994], Bester[1985] and a recent survey by (Frexias and Rochet 
[1998]) 
4 Much of the literature on sovereign borrowers has focused on the determinants of country 
access to capital and on the incentives to repay private creditors. For example, see Eaton and 
Fernandez [1995], and more recent work by Tirole [2003], and  Chamon [2001].    
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that under the heading of debt relief,  “bad” loans will eventually be forgiven
5. This paper 
shows that the possibility of future debt relief can introduce several distortions into the IFI-
borrower relationship, including  inefficient conditionality, credit rationing, and the 
misallocation of lending resources to “extractive” borrowers.  
 
Debt relief can enable both the IFI and the borrower to resolve repayment difficulties 
at a possibly lower cost compared with a disruptive immediate end to lending. However,   
while debt relief is potentially “cheaper”, accessing the debt relief mechanism requires the 
IFI to continue lending until debt relief actually becomes available, thereby increasing the 
stock of overall debt. Instead, although disruptive, canceling lending when reforms first fail 
results in a lower stock of debt or arrears. Therefore, the decision to resolve repayment 
difficulties through debt relief versus an immediate cancellation of lending depends on when 
conditionality is first breeched: if the existing stock of debt is small enough, then lending is 
cancelled; otherwise, continued lending until debt relief becomes available is optimal.  
 
By providing the IFI with an incentive to suspend the  enforcement of  contracts and 
continue lending, the prospect of debt relief can become a source of  time inconsistency, 
increasing the potential for adverse selection, and the need for debt relief itself. An extractive 
borrower can implement reforms until the debt stock is big enough, so that debt relief 
becomes the IFI’s preferred option for managing repayment difficulties. Once this threshold 
is reached, the borrower can freely pursue it’s own policy objectives, assured that the IFI will 
continue lending until debt relief is provided.  Specifically, for some borrowers, realizing the 
contracted policy outcome or reform is costly, as extractive policies are more lucrative. Thus, 
without the prospect of debt relief, since the IFI would cancel lending if reforms failed, an 
extractive borrower would implement extractive polices immediately after the loan is made 
rather than accumulate debt. However, if the debt relief option exists, then extractive 
borrowers can lucratively “hold up” an IFI, reforming until sufficient debt is accumulated; 
after which, the policy maker can implement extractive policies, while the IFI continues to 
lend.  
 
 “Hold up” is costly to an IFI, and mitigating  the “hold up” risk potentially distorts 
the terms of  IFI lending contracts. Instead of contracting upon the first best policy 
outcome—the reform most likely to succeed, and thus ensure repayment-- the IFI may 
require a more “ambitious” reform—one with a smaller chance of success--but provides 
more information about the borrower’s type if it is successful. That is, optimal lending 
contracts now reflect a tradeoff between the need to learn about the borrower in order to 
avoid “hold up” versus the need to contract upon policies that provide the highest expected 
payoffs. Moreover, because sovereignty imposes limits on the set of contractible policy 
outcomes, credit rationing can be an equilibrium response to the hold up risk. For example, 
an external lender cannot contract upon the dismissal of the Prime Minister. Thus, if the risk 
of  hold up is severe enough,  and a successful outcome from the set of contractible policies 
                                                 
5 The cost of debt forgiveness is usually shared between the IFIs and bilateral creditors. For 
example, in the current HIPC initiative, slightly more than of the financing comes from 
bilateral creditors, with the IFIs accounting for the rest. See the IMF HIPC Fact Sheet.    
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is insufficiently informative about a borrower’s type, then the IFI may be deterred from 
lending.  
 
Therefore, while successful reform implementation  is inherently uncertain and debt 
relief provides a possibly lower cost mechanism of dealing with the consequences of reform 
failure, it is not without substantial costs. Introducing ambiguity over the provision of debt 
relief, and transparency in current contracts, so that future borrowers can observe actions in 
current contracts, can reduce the incidence of distortionary contracts. In this case, instead of 
resorting to inefficient contracts as a means of sorting borrowers, uncertainty over the 
provision of debt relief can itself serve as an effective screening mechanism, allowing the IFI 
to offer the first best contract. And because  current actions are observable to future 
borrowers, the IFI has an incentive to maintain that ambiguity, not providing  debt relief if 
reforms fail.     
 
These arguments are developed within the simplest framework possible, and are 
related to a small but rapidly growing body of analytical work focused on studying the 
relationship between multilateral  lenders and sovereign borrowers. A common theme in this 
literature is the idea that the welfare of the domestic poor enters directly in the utility 
function of IFIs  (the interdependent utility function approach). Hence,  multilateral 
institutions continue to lend to help protect the poor despite observing ill conceived 
government policies (Sevensen [2000], Federico [2001]). Another strand of literature 
attributes the failure of conditional aid to imperfect monitoring; the budgetary process can be 
quite complex, and resources are fungible. Together, these factors can again enable aid 
recipients to divert resources to their preferred use, minimizing the effectiveness of 
conditionality (Cordella and Dell’Arrica  [2001]). Of course, while concern about poverty 
and imperfect monitoring undoubtedly account for key features of the relationship between 
sovereign borrowers and multilateral lenders the case study evidence suggests that repayment 
considerations and the stock of debt may also be of paramount concern
6.  
 
II.      MODEL 
A.   Setup 
A lending contract consists of a loan disbursement from the IFI to the policy maker 
(PM), and a promise from the policy maker (PM) to choose
7 a particular policy outcome. 
                                                 
6 In addition to the aforementioned IEO report, documenting 5 country cases, a study funded 
by the Dutch government (8 countries) conclude that repayment considerations play an 
important role in the relationship between lender and borrower. 
7The analysis could also be recast in terms of contracting upon the PM’s effort level. And at 
the cost of additional complexity, contracts  could also specify both choice and effort; see for 
example Diamond [1998].    
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Borrower sovereignty is assumed to limit the set of contractible policy outcomes
8. Let  A x and 
B x denote the two possible contractible policy outcomes, where  1 AB xx >> . A lending 
arrangement is initially scheduled to last two periods, and in reach period the IFI decides 
whether to lend a fixed amount—normalized to 1--before observing the policy outcome. To 
provide a tractable motivation for policy makers to borrow from IFIs, I assume that lending 
arrangements are concessional
9 . A fraction β  of cumulative  borrowing is repayable at the 
end of the second period if  the contracted policy outcomes, 
*
i x  were successfully observed in 
each period of the arrangement
10; for simplicity both the interest and discount rates are set to 
zero.  
 
There are two technologies available to deal with reform failures. If the contracted 
policy 
*
i x  is not observed at the end of period t  and the IFI cancels lending, then it incurs  
cost  t β . Otherwise, if 
*
i x  is not observed the IFI can delay cancellation until a debt 
restructuring mechanism becomes available on a future date T .  The IFI pays a fixed cost τ  
to use this mechanism and since it is only available on date T , the IFI must continue lending 
until then. To focus on how the possibility of debt relief can influence the IFI’s reaction to  a 
reform failure, I assume that:  
 
2 β τβ < <       (0.1) 
 
 
Policy makers vary in their preference for reform. To capture this heterogeneity, 
extractive policy makers—type 
E θ -- derive negative payoffs if reforms are succesful. For 
example, reforms may limit the scope for extractive behavior. In contrast, PMs of type 
G θ  
earn positive payoffs whenever reforms are successful. In addition to determining the 
payoffs, the parameter 
j θ  also influences whether the chosen policy is realized. Specifically, 
although a policy  i x  is chosen, its realization or successful implementation  is uncertain. 
Underlying this approach is the idea  that perceptions about a policy maker’s type—his 
preference for extraction--can impact the behavior of agents. Thus, even if a policy maker 
were to publicly choose a particular policy, beliefs about the policy maker’s commitment can 
                                                 
8 See for example the requirement that conditionality be consistent with “national ownership” 
(IMF[2002]).    
9 Zettelmeyer and Joshi (2003) analyzes the concessional element of IMF lending. Other 
reasons that countries may seek IFI lending include signaling to other creditors (Marchesi 
et.al[1999] and Morris and Shin [2002]) , as well as a difference in time preference between 
the IFI and the policy maker Bulow and Rogoff [1989b] .  
10 By making repayment contingent on whether the contracted policies are realized, the 
analysis abstracts away from some of the issues related to repayment incentives. Classic 
references include Eaton and Gersowitz [1981] and Bulow and Rogoff [1989a].     
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influence whether the policy is actually successful
11. More precisely, both a PM’s type, 
j θ , 
and the magnitude of the intended reform determine the probability of successful 
implementation. Let  ( ) ,
j
i pxθ denote the probability that a policy maker of type 
j θ  
successfully realizes  policy outcome  i x . And as a benchmark case,  policy  B x  is assumed to 
yield higher expected payoffs for 
G θ :  
 
  ( ) ( ) ,,
GG
B BA A p xx p xx θθ >  (0.2) 
 
 
Payoff functions are linear, and the policy maker (PM)’s payoffs are determined by 
the IFI’s net disbursement () D , the policy outcome,  i x , and the PM’s policy preferences or 
its “type”: 
G θ  or 
E θ  :  
 
  ( ) ,,
PM j j
ii Ux D x D θθ = +  (0.3) 
 
where  0
G θ >  and  0
E θ < : only  the PM of type  0
E θ <  prefers no change in policy:  0 i x = . In 
the case of the IFI,  payoffs are positive only if there is both lending, and the realization of 
the contracted policy outcome, 
*
i x ; payoffs are negative if it lends and 
*









x Di f x x
Ux
D if x x
 − =  = 
− ≠  
 (0.4) 
 
Thus, given the payoff functions, the policy preferences of the IFI and a policy maker of type 
G θ  are perfectly aligned. And it is less costly to cancel lending in period one rather than use 
the debt restructuring mechanism available in period T. However, the debt relief option is 
optimal if the contract is breeched in period two. 
 
                                                 
11 Similar arguments are often used to explain features of monetary policy, and disinflation 
and economic reform  programs. For example, compared with a “good” policy maker, a PM 
with a reputation for rent extraction or profligate spending may have less success at 
achieving low inflation despite an announced anti-inflation policy. See surveys by 
Drazen[1999] and Persson and Tabellini [2001]. On the other hand, it may take a policy 
maker with a known inflation bias to credibly fight inflation (Masson and Drazen [1992]).  
12 Note that the IFI derives negative payoffs even if a more ambitious reform than the 
orginally contracted policy is observed. This assumption is made for simplicity, as it 
eliminates any singalling motive on the part of policy makers.    
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B.   Timing 
  Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model. The IFI is the agenda setter. In period 
one, it decides whether to lend to the policy maker, and what conditionality or policy 
outcome:  A x  or  B x  to contract. Let 
1*
i x denote the contracted policy in period one. If the IFI 
decides to lend { }
1*,1 i x , then it disburses 1 to the policy maker (PM). After the disbursement, 
the PM chooses 
1*
i x , a different policy, or leaves the policy stance unchanged: 
1 0 i x = . If 
1*
i x  is 
not observed, then the IFI cancels the lending arrangement. If 
1*
i x  is observed, then the IFI 
chooses whether to lend in period two, { }
2*,1 i x . If the IFI disburses in period two, the policy 
maker again selects its policy stance; if  
2*
i x is successful, then 
G θ repays 2β . Otherwise, if  
2*
i x  is not realized, then the IFI continues to lend until period T , when debt relief is 
provided.  
 
Without uncertainty about a policy maker’s policy preferences, 
j θ , lending decisions 
are efficient across time and borrowers, as  { }
*,1 B x is the equilibrium contract between the IFI 
and type 
G θ  in both periods and there is no lending to 
E θ . But the IFI is often only partially 
informed about 
j θ , and the presence of debt relief can distort lending arrangements. The 





















•  IFI decides whether to lend: { }
1*,1 i x  
•  Disbursement is made 
•  PM chooses 
1
i x  
• 
1
i x  is realized 
•  If 
11 *
ii x x ≠ , program is cancelled 
•  Otherwise, IFI lends in period two  { }
2*,1 i x  
Period two 
•  IFI disburses 
•  PM chooses 
2
i x  
• 
2
i x  is realized 
•  PM chooses whether to repay or hold up IFI   
 
8
C.   Period 2 Equilibrium 
Only the reform outcome is observable; the PM’s type, 
i θ , and his reform choice in 
are unobserved. At the beginning of period two, let 
2 p  denote the IFI’s probability 
assessment that the policy maker is of type 
G θ . By assumption, 
2 p is common information, 










11 * 11 *
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Condition (0.6) notes that observing  A x --the “bigger” of the two possible reforms provides 

















< <     (0.6) 
 
In period 2 an IFI cannot credibly commit not to continue lending if implementation fails, 
and there is no gain from  strategic conditionality. As a result, if the IFI does lend in period 2, 
then it offers { }
2*,1 B x --the first best contract and type 
E θ  implements the hold up strategy—
0
t

















, so that   
type  
G θ always chooses 
2*
B x  rather than choosing 0 in period two in order to avoid repaying 
debt
13.  Given τ , the IFI’s decision to lend in period 2 depends on it’s assessment of the 
PM’s type. And intuitively, the greater the cost of hold up, the less likely is the IFI to lend in 
period 2: 
 
Proposition 1: The IFI lends in period two if  ( ) ( )
1*
22 i px pτ ≥ , where  ( ) 2 '0 p τ > . 
 
                                                 
13 Without this assumption, since both types of policy makers would not reform in the second 
period, the IFI would never lend in the second period.   
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From Proposition 1, the first period contracted outcome
1*
i x  determines whether the IFI lends 
in period two. Otherwise, if PMs knew that the realization of 
1*
i x  was irrelevant for  period 
two lending, then there would be no incentive to adhere to the lending contract, and in the 
first period  PMs of both types would choose their preferred policy outcome. This 
uninteresting case is ignored by assuming that the IFI offers 
1*
i x  only if it’s successful 
realization provides enough information about the borrower so that lending is optimal in 
period two.  
 
D.   Period One Equilibrium 
C.1 Policy Maker’s Incentives 
 
This section identifies when a contracted policy outcome is incentive compatible.  
Suppose 
1*
i x  is the contracted first period policy outcome. If type 
E θ chooses 
1*
i x , then with 
probability   ()
1*,
E
i px θ the PM gets 
1* 1
E
i x θ +  in period one, plus the hold up payoff  1 T −  
beginning in period two. If 
1*
i x  is not realized, then 
E θ  earns 1. Thus, 
E θ ’s  expected payoffs 
from choosing 
1*
i x is :  
  () ( )
1* 1* 1* ,1 ,
EE E
ii i px x T px θθ θ    ++ −    (0.7) 
 
Since the disbursement is made before 
1*
i x is realized, 
E θ ’s payoff from choosing the status 
quo is 1. Thus, 
1*
i x is incentive compatible for type 
E θ if the disutility from the realization of 
1*
i x is not too big relative to payoffs from hold up:  







>>  (0.8) 
 
Since  B x  is the first best, if 
1*
iB x x = , then type 
G θ  routinely chooses 
1*
i x . However, if  A x  is 
offered, then  
G θ ’s expected payoffs from choosing 
1
A x  in the first period is  ()
1 1, ,
PM G
A Vx θ . 
For type 
G θ , 
1
A x  is incentive compatible if it makes the policy maker no worse off than 
choosing B x . Therefore, if offered, 
G θ  chooses the less efficient contract 
1
A x  if it’s probability 
of realization  ( )
1*,
G
A px θ  is sufficiently large. A policy outcome 
1*
i x induces pooling if it 
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint of both types of policy makers:  
 
 







>>  and  ( ) ( )
1* 1* ,,
GG
ii px px θ θ > , then { }
1*,1 i x induces pooling. 







<  and  ( ) ( )
1* 1* ,,
GG
ii px px θ θ > , then { }
1*,1 i x induces full screening, as type 
E θ chooses 0, and 
G θ chooses { }




C.2. Both  
1
A x   and  
1
B x induce screening in period one.  
In this the simplest case, both 
1
B x  and 
1
A x screen extractive borrowers, so that if 
1
i x  is 
realized, then the IFI enters period two fully aware that the  PM of type 
G θ  --and there is no 
risk of hold up. Since both contracts sort borrowers, but the first best contract,
1
B x , provides  
higher expected payoffs, if the IFI does decide to lend in period one, it offers { }
1*,1 B x --the 
second best contract is never observed. Although the hold up risk is fully eliminated in this 
case, extractive borrowers can still exploit the ex-post nature of conditionality: accepting a 
lending contract, earning the immediate payoff, 1, but privately choosing not to implement 
the contracted outcome. Given this risk, the IFI may elect to ration credit; under this scenario, 
if the IFI is sufficiently prejudiced about the set of borrowers, then even policy makers 
willing to choose  B x  --type  
G θ  would be denied  IFI contracts: 
 
Proposition 3: If  11 p p ≥ , then  B x is both feasible and optimal. If   11 p p < , then there is no 
lending. 
 
C. 3. Both 
1
B x   and  
1
A x induce pooling behavior in period one.  
In this case, the available set of contractible policies do not fully screen borrowers, as 
sovereignty constraints are fully binding. Consequently, the IFI faces a key tradeoff. Offering 
1
B x  generates higher payoffs in the first period, both because the expected payoffs are higher 
than 
1
A x , as well as, since  () ( )
11 ,,
jj
AB px px θ θ < , repayment is more likely under  
1
B x  than  
1
A x . However, because of condition (0.6), observing  
1
B x   provides less information about the 
borrower’s type at the beginning of period two than 
1
A x . The IFI’s initial beliefs about the set 
of borrowers,  1 p , and the cost of hold up τ  play key roles in resolving this tradeoff. 
Specifically, a period one contract { }
1,1 i x is feasible if it renders the IFI’s expected payoffs 
positive in each period. That is, it ex-ante  provides the IFI with  positive expected payoffs in 
the period one lending phase, and the ex-post realization of 
1
i x  --at the end of period one—
ensures that the IFI’s period two expected  payoff is positive.  
 
More concretely, if the IFI offers { }
1,1 i x , then it expects to observe 
1







ii pp p x p p x θ θ =+ − ; and if 
1
i x  is observed, then the IFI receives 
( )
1 1 i x − at the end of period one . Therefore, period one static payoffs are positive if 
ii 1 11 0 i px p β   −− − − ≥   . But in addition to satisfying the period one constraint,  the ex post 
realization of a feasible contract { }
1,1 i x  must also provide the IFI with positive expected   
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payoffs in  period two. To exposit simply the main intuition,  I assume that whenever period 
two payoffs are positive, then so are period one payoffs
14. Therefore, a contract is feasible 
whenever its successful realization in the first period produces positive second period 
payoffs:  
 
Proposition 4: { }
1,1 i x is feasible if  ( )
11








And intuitively, as τ , the cost of using the debt relief mechanism increases, the 
threshold level of initial beliefs that render a contract feasible also rises.  Suppose that 
( ) 1 , B pp x τ > , so that both  A x and  B x  are feasible. Although the full information optimal 
contract { } ,1 B x  is feasible, if the cost of using the debt relief mechanism is large, then the IFI 
may still offer { }
1 ,1 A x . In this case, the gain in information if  A x  is realized offsets the cost of 
deviating from the optimal contract. Thus, the first best contract { }
1 ,1 B x is offered only when 
the borrower’s reputation for reform is big enough: 
 
Proposition 5: { } ,1 B x is optimal only if  ( )
2
1 ,, AB pf x x τ > , where  ( ) ( )
21 ,, , AB B fx x fx τ τ >   
 
Figure 1 illustrates these ideas. Below the curve  ( )
1 , A fx τ , there are no feasible 
contracts, as credit is rationed. Between   ( )
1 , A fx τ  and  ( )
1 , B fx τ   A x  is the only  feasible 
contract, and the equilibrium first period contract becomes { }
1 ,1 A x . In the region between  
( )
2 ,, AB fx x τ  and  ( )
1 , B fx τ  both contracts are feasible, but { }
1 ,1 A x remains the optimal 
contract. Only when uncertainty about the borrower’s type becomes sufficiently small, above 
the  ( )
2 ,, AB fx x τ  line, does the first best contract { }
1 ,1 B x become optimal.  
 
C. 4.   A x induces screening;   B x induces pooling.  
  The IFI faces a more extreme tradeoff than in the previous section. While the contract 
1
A x  remains a costly deviation from the first best, 
1
B x ,  if 
1
A x  is observed at the end of period 
one, then the borrower’s type is fully revealed. Therefore, since 
1
A x  provides a relatively 
more powerful signal of the borrower’s type,  it is both feasible and optimal over a wider 
range of ( ) 1, p τ  than the previous case. Thus, compared with the previous cases, although the 
incidence of credit rationing is decreased, the first best contract is less likely to be offered.   
 
                                                 
14 Relaxing this assumption does not substantially alter the main results; see Appendix.   
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  Proposition 6: 1.{ }
1 ,1 B x is optimal only if  ( )
311
1 ,, AB pf x x τ > , where 
( ) ( )
311 211 ,, ,, AB AB fx x fx x τ τ > . 2. { }
1 ,1 A x is optimal in the interval  ( ) ()
311
1 1 ,, AA B px p f xxτ << , 
where () ()
11
1 , AA px f xτ < . 
  
III.   DEBT RELEIF  AMBIGUITY 
  The analysis has outlined how  the prospect of debt relief can create incentives for 
“hold up”, leading to inefficient lending contracts. How robust is this argument? And what 
policy conclusions might be inferred? To address these questions, this section modifies the 
information structure along two important dimensions. Instead of assuming that policy 
makers know with certainty that debt relief will be available on date T , the argument 
considers the case where policy makers are uncertain about the provision of debt relief. The 
argument is also extended by considering how both the IFI’s and the policy maker’s behavior 
are affected when their actions are observable to subsequent  borrowers. That is, there is 
ambiguity over the provision of future debt relief, but transparency in current contracts.    
 
  To capture intuitively the notion of ambiguity over the availability of debt relief, 
assume that domestic policy makers are uncertain about whether the IFI’s major shareholders 
have endowed the IFI’s management with the debt relief option if reform fails
15. In contrast, 
the IFI’s management is fully aware of  the shareholders’ debt relief decision
16. More 
precisely, from equation (0.1)  z is an  an indicator function that takes on the value of one if 









  =  
  > 
 (0.9) 
 
and  () 1 Pz = denotes the PM’s assessment that the debt relief option is available to the IFI.   
  
                                                 
15 In the governance structure of international financial institutions, management reports to 
an executive board, appointed by shareholders. The executive board is responsible for the 
institutions’ policies.     
16 Of course, the management of the IFI may also be partially informed about the 
shareholder’s debt relief decision for some time. However, management is likely to have 
more information about this decision than domestic policy makers.     
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  To analyze the impact of repeated contract transparency in the simplest possible 
manner, I assume that the IFI sequentially engages in two lending arrangements with two 
different borrowers, each independently drawn from the same distribution of types, where 
p denotes the prior probability that PM is of type 
G θ . Let   1 N  take on the value of one if 
reform failed and debt relief was provided in the first arrangement. Because of transparency, 
1 N  becomes common knowledge in the second arrangement. Given that the debt relief option 
was available () 1 z = , let α denote the conditional probability that the IFI cancels lending in 
the first arrangement if reform fails
17. Using  Bayes rule, the probability that hold up will be 
unsuccessful in period two, 2 0 N = , given that the IFI did not provide debt relief in the first 
arrangement after reform failed: 
 
 






























= == + =
=
=
 =+ − = 
 (0.10) 
 
where in the second arrangement the IFI always provides debt relief if  second period reform 
fails. 
 
A.   Second Arrangement  
  Working backwards, suppose the IFI offers the first best contract in the first period of 
the second arrangement: { }
1,2,1 B x . An extractive borrower chooses { }
1,2,1 B x in order to 










.  If qq ≥ , then choosing  { }
1,2,1 B x is not incentive compatible for a PM of 
type 
E θ . In this case, because an extractive borrower will not attempt hold up,  the IFI need 
not use conditionality as a sorting mechanism. Instead, if it does decide to enter into a second 
arrangement, it can offer the first best contract, as the realization of 
1,2
B x  reveals the borrower 
to be of type 
G θ .  
 
                                                 
17 Although the IFI’s decision to provide debt relief is modeled as probabilistic, this 
randomization is easily interpreted as representing the policy maker’s uncertainty and 
resulting conjecture about whether the IFI will provide debt relief when that option is 
available, rather than some deliberate randomization on the part of the IFI.     
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Proposition 7: If qq ≥  and   p p ≥ , then  B x is both feasible and optimal in the second 
arrangement 
 
In contrast, suppose that  A x  and  B x  induce pooling when there is no uncertainty over the 
provision of debt relief, then from Proposition 5,  B x would have been offered only if 
( )
2 ,, AB p fx x p τ >> .  
 
B.   First Arrangement 
  In the second period of the first arrangement, if reform fails and the IFI provides debt relief, 
then it obtains  τ −  , plus   ( ) () ,2
G
BB px x T θ  −   if the policy maker is of type 
G θ . Providing 
debt relief in the first arrangement eliminates any ambiguity about its availability to the 
subsequent borrower. In this case, payoffs in the second arrangement resemble the earlier 




i Vxpp τ  
denote the IFI’s expected payoffs in the second arrangement, given that debt relief was 
provided in the first arrangement. Conversely, suppose denying debt relief in the first 
arrangement effectively deters PMs of type 
E θ from attempting hold up in the second period, 
then the IFI earns:  
 
  ( ) () ( )
2 1,2 2, 2 , ,
GI
BB B p xx T V x p β θτ  −+ − +   (0.11) 
 
 
Assume that the net cost of canceling lending if reform fails in the first arrangement, 
2β τ − , is not too big. Then if  ( ) 0 P zq = ≥ , then in the first arrangement it is common 
knowledge that the IFI will cancel lending with certainty whenever reform fails. As a result, 
if the IFI chooses to lend, it offers the first best contract in each period of  both arrangements, 
since prior uncertainty about the provision of debt relief,  ( ) 0 Pz = , deters extractive 
borrowers from hold up strategies. If however ( ) 0 P zq = < , then in the first arrangement the 
conditional probability that the IFI will cancel lending if reform fails, given that  the debt 















Consequently,  () 0/ P zq =  is the total probability that lending will be cancelled in the first 
arrangement if reform fails. And if  ()
2
0 P zq = > , then type 
E θ will not pursue the hold up 
strategy in the first  arrangement, and the  IFI, if it chooses to lend, will offer the first best 
contract.  
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Proposition 8: If  () 0 P zq => , then the IFI is expected to cancel lending whenever reforms 
fail. Therefore, if the IFI chooses to lend, the first best contract is always offered. If  
()
2
0 qP z q <= < , then type 
E θ  is deterred from hold up in the first arrangement, and the 
IFI offers the first best contract. If reform fails in the first arrangement, the IFI cancels 
lending with probability 
* α . Otherwise, if  ()
2
0 P zq = < , then debt relief uncertainty does 
not sort borrowers.   
 
  
IV.   DISCUSSION 
 
This paper has argued that while debt relief can be an important mechanism for 
managing reform failure, it can distort lending contracts between multilateral lenders and 
sovereign borrowers, leading in some cases to the increased provision of debt relief, or the 
contracting of “excessively difficult” reforms. Uncertainty over the provision of debt relief, 
coupled with “transparent” lending arrangements can mitigate some of these distortions. 
Intuitively, sufficient doubt about whether debt relief is available can deter “extractive” 
borrowers from hold up strategies, while “transparent” lending arrangements can induce an 
IFI to preserve that doubt whenever reforms fail.  
Some key  simplifications underlie these arguments. Most notably, to easily motivate 
the  “hold up” strategy,  the argument assumed that an IFI  interacts with a single domestic 
policy maker who expects to remain in power throughout the lending relationship. Yet, 
governments or policy makers often change. A richer formulation of the policy making 
process might reveal how expectations about a policy maker’s political durability might 
influence  lending contracts, and perhaps how such contracts might affect the political 
process. That said, while further research may shed additional insights, and no doubt qualify 
when  “hold up” strategies are optimal, it seems unlikely to reverse the basic intuition behind 
these strategies. For example, if a policy maker expects to be short lived,  “hold up” can still 
be optimal depending on its ease. Accumulating a small amount of debt may make debt relief 
optimal for the IFI, allowing the short lived extractive policy maker sufficient time to 
“recoup” its reform costs. In turn, this may make it easier for subsequent policy makers  to 
engage in “hold up”.   
 
Perhaps a more fundamental avenue for future research is the need to clarify how 
repayment difficulties affect the payoffs of various groups within an IFI. Although  IFI 
shareholders ultimately determine whether debt relief is provided if reforms fail, they 
delegate the negotiation, monitoring and design of lending contracts to an institutional staff. 
And it is unclear from the analysis whether “hold up” occurs at the staff or shareholder level. 
More precisely, suppose that “career concerns” or other similar considerations make it 
unpalatable for current staff—the delegated monitor-- to report repayment difficulties to 
shareholders—the principal; instead, because of regular rotation across lending assignments 
or other factors  passing the reporting of repayment difficulties to future staff may yield 
higher payoffs. In this case, focusing on the design of internal governance may be key to 
mitigating “hold up” risk  










V.   APPENDIX 
 
Proposition 1: The IFI lends in period two if  ( ) ( )
1*
22 i px pτ ≥ , where  ( ) 2 '0 p τ > . 
 
Proof: To derive the value of a lending arrangement in period two,  note that with probability 
( )
1*
2 i p x  the IFI lends to a PM of  type
G θ  , resulting in expected payoffs 
()
2* 2* ,1 2
G
BB px x θ β  −+  if 
2*
B x successful; with probability  ( )
2* 1,
G
B px θ −  
2*
B x  is not realized 
and the IFI continues to lend until period T  with payoffs  ( ) () ,1 2
G
BB px x T θ  −−  . 
However, since debt relief transforms the accumulated debt stock to τ  , the expected payoffs 
from prolonged lending to type 
G θ  is   ( ) ( ) ,2
G
BB px x T θ τ − − .  Alternatively, with 
probability  () ()
1*
2 1 i p x − , the  IFI lends to type 
E θ  and is held up, at a cost  τ − . Therefore, 
given the PM’s reputation in period two,  the IFI’s value from a lending arrangement in 
period 2 is: 
 
() ()
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
() ()














px p x x p x p x xT
Vp x x
px
θβ θ θ τ
τ




The IFI lends in period two if and only if the value of a period two lending arrangement is 
non negative:  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( )
1* 2* 2* 2* 1*
2 2 ,1 2 1 , , 2 1 0
GG G
iBB B B B i px p x x p x p x xT px θβ θ θ τ τ    −+ − − − − − − ≥    (0.14) 
 





() () () () () () ()
2*
22 2* 2* 2* 2* ,1 2 1 , , 2 2 ,
i GG G G
BB B B B B
px p
px x px px x T px
τ
τ
θβ θ θ τ θ
≥=
   −+ − − − + −   




where  () () ()
() ( ) () ()
2
2*
2 2* 2* 2*
11 1
'1 2 , 0
,1 1 , 2
G


















>>  and  ( ) ( )
1* 1* ,,
GG
ii px px θ θ > , then { }
1*, i x b induces pooling. 







<  and  ( ) ( )
1* 1* ,,
GG
ii px px θ θ > , then { }
1*, i x b induces screening, as type 
E θ implements 0, and 
G θ chooses { }
1*, i x b . 
 
 
Proof: Suppose { }
1,1 i x is offered. Type 
E θ ’s expected payoffs from choosing 
1
i x  is: 
 
  () ( )
11 1 ,1 ,
EE E
ii i px x T px θθ θ    ++ −     (1.1) 
 
 Choosing 
1 0 x =  gives 
E θ  a reservation payoff of 1. Thus, 
1
i x  satisfies 
E θ ’s incentive 







>> . In the case of type 
G θ , since  B x  is the first best, 
it is always incentive compatible for type to choose  B x  if it is offered. If  A x  is offered, then  
type 
G θ expected payoffs from choosing  A x ,  ( )
1 1, ,
G
A Vx θ  is: 
  () ( )
( ) ()






1, , , 1 ,







Vx p x p x




  ++ + − +   =+ −




G θ ’s reservation payoff from choosing  B x  instead is: 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )() ( )
11 22 2 2 1 ,1 ,1 2 1 , 1 , 2 1 ,
GG GG G G G G
BB BB B B B B px x px x px px x T px θ θθ θ β θθ θ θ    ++ +− + − + − +−     
(1.3) 
 
Therefore,  the contract { }
1 ,1 A x  satisfies 
G θ ’s incentive compatibility constraint (IC) if : 




() () ( )
() () () () () ()
11
1* 2* 2* 2*
2, 2
,,




GG G G G
AB B B B B
px x
px px
xp x x p x T p x x
θθ
θθ
θθ θ β θ θ
 +  ≥≡











< , then { }
1,1 i x does not satisfy  
E θ ’s IC, and 
E θ  chooses 0. If 
( ) ( )
1* 1* ,,
GG
ii px px θ θ > , then 
G θ ’s IC is satisfied, and 
G θ  chooses { }








< and  ( ) ( )
1* 1* ,,
GG
ii px px θ θ > , then { }
1,1 i x induces screening.  
 
Proposition 3: If  11 p p ≥ , then  B x is both feasible and optimal. If   11 p p < , then there is no 
lending. 
 
Proof: If  B x induces screening in period one, then the IFI’s period one payoffs are:  
 
 
() () () () ( ) () () ( ) () ( )
()




,1 ,1 2 1 , , 21 ,
1, , max
1, 0
GG G G G
BB BB B B B B I
B
pp x x p x x p x p x xT p x
Vp x
p
θθ β θ θ τ θ       −+ −+ + − − − − −         =  
  −−  
 (1.5) 
 
and the IFI enters into a lending arrangement if expected payoffs are non-negative 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) ( ) ()
()
11 22 2 1
1
1
,1 ,1 2 1 , , 2 1 ,
10
GG G G G
BB BB B B B B pp x x p x x p x p x xT p x
p
θθ β θ θ τ θ     −+ −+ + − − − − −    
−− ≥
 
or if  1 p  is sufficiently large: 
 
()
() () () () () () () ( ) (
11
11 22 2 1
1
,1 ,1 2 1 , , 21 ,
B
GG G G G
BB BB B B B B
pp x
px x px x px px x T px θ θβ θ θ τ θ
≥=
   −+ −+ + − − − − −    
 (1.6) 




Proposition 4: { }
1,1 i x is feasible if  ( )
11







>    
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Suppose that { }
1,1 i x induces pooling in period one. The IFI expects to observe 




ii ppx p p x θ θ +− ; if 
1
i x  is 
observed, then the IFI receives ( )




i Vp xτ  in period 2. 
1
i x  
is not realized with probability  ( ) ( ) ( )
11
11 1, 1 ,
GE
ii pp x p px θ θ −− − and  the lending arrangement 
is cancelled at the end of period one, with the IFI earning   1 − ; the IFI’s value from a lending 
arrangement in period one is: 
 
  ()








,1 , 1 ,
,, m a x







ppx p p x x V p x
Vx p




    + −− + −      = 




The contract { }
1,1 i x  is feasible if the IFI’s participation constraint in both periods are 








Bi Vxpxτ > . Since it is assumed that positive second 
payoffs are both a necessary and sufficient condition for contract feasibility, using Bayes’ 
Rule and Proposition 1, { }
1,1 i x is feasible if: 
  ()
( ) ( )


















  +−  
 (1.8) 
  .  
 
Proposition 5: { } 1,1 x is optimal only if  ( )
2
1 ,, AB pf x x τ > , where  ( ) ( )
21 ,, , AB B fx x fx τ τ >   
Proof: From Proposition 4,  
  ( ) ( )




1 ,, , AB hx x p τ  denote the difference in payoffs available to the IFI from offering  
{ }
1 ,1 B x compared to  { }
1 ,1 A x : 
  () ( ) ( )
11 1 1
11 1 ,, , ,, ,,
II
AB B A hx x p V x p V x p τ ττ =− (1.10) 
 
The value of lending in period one increases with the borrower’s initial reputation: 
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but the marginal impact is higher when the first best contract is offered:  
 
















1 ,, , AB hx x p τ is monotonically increasing with  1 p . From the definition of  
()
11 , B fx τ , the IFI is indifferent between  offering { }
1 ,1 B x and not lending in period one: 
 
  ( ) () ( ) ( )
11 11 1 11
1 ,, , , 0 , ,, 0
I
AB B A B h x x p fx Vxfx ττ τ τ = =− < (1.13) 
but, 
 
  () ( ) ( )
11 1 1
1 ,, , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 0
II
AB B A f x x p Vx Vx ττ τ = =−>  (1.14) 
 
Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem and the monotonicity of  ()
11
1 ,, , AB hx x p τ , there 
exists a unique   () ( )
21 1 ,, ,, 1 AB B fx x fx ττ  ∈  such that  
 
  ( )
11 2 ,, , 0 AB hx x f τ =  (1.15) 
 
and for all  ()
2
1 ,, AB pf x x τ >   ()
11
1 ,, , 0 AB hx x p τ > , while   ( )
11
1 ,, , 0 AB hx x p τ ≤  for 
()
2
1 ,, AB pf x x τ ≤ . 
 
 
Proposition 6: 1.{ }
1 ,1 B x is optimal only if  ( )
311
1 ,, AB pf x x τ > , where  ( ) ( )
311 211 ,, ,, AB AB fx x fx x τ τ > . 
2. { }
1 ,1 A x is optimal in the interval  ( ) ( )
311
11,, AA B px p f xxτ << , where ()( )
41 11 ,, AA fx fx τ τ < . 
 
Proof: Since contract { }
1 ,1 A x induces screening, an argument similar to Proposition 3 can be 
used to show that { }
1 ,1 A x produces positive payoffs if  ( ) 11 A p px >  
 
From equation (1.8),  () ( )
11 ,, AA px px τ τ <  if and only if 
r




r ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () ()
22 2
11 22 2
,1 1 , 2










 −−− +  =
  ++ −−− +−  
 (1.16) 
 
To identify when { }
1 ,1 B x is optimal, let  ( ) ( )( )
11 1 1
11 1 ,, , ,, ,
II
AB B A g xx p V xp V xp ττ =− , where 










AA BB B B B I
A
p px x px x px px x T
Vxp
p
θ θβ θ θ τ     − +− + + − − −      = 
−− 




B Vxp τ  is given by equation (1.7). By an argument similar to Proposition 4, there 
exists a  ( )
311 ,, AB fx x τ  such that  ( ) ( )
11 311 ,, , ,, 0 AB AB gx x f x x ττ = . Moreover, since { }
1 ,1 A x screens 









AA Vxp Vxp τ ≥ , so that   ( ) ( )
11 11
11 ,, , ,, , AB AB g xx p h xx p ττ ≤  for all  1 p . Therefore, 
() ()
11 3 11 3 ,, , 0 ,, , AB AB g xx f h xx f ττ =≤ and  ( )
11 2 ,, , 0 AB hx x f τ = , which, since  () h ⋅  is non 
decreasing implies that   ( ) ( )
311 211 ,, ,, AB AB fx x fx x τ τ ≥ .   
 
 





1,2,1 B x is offered in the first period of the second arrangement, then a type 
E θ ’s expected 
payoffs from choosing 
1,2
B x  is:  ( ) () ( ) ( )
1,2 ,1 1 ,
EE E
BB B px x q qT px θθ θ  ++− +−  . Given that 
type 
E θ ’s reservation payoff is one, it does not choose 
1,2









. Thus, if 
qq > , then a separating equilibrium exists, and from Proposition 3,  B x is both feasible and 
optimal if  p p ≥ .  
 
Proposition 8: If  () 0 P zq => , then the IFI is expected to cancel lending whenever reforms 
fail. Therefore, if the IFI chooses to lend, the first best contract is always offered. If  
()
2
0 qP z q <= < , then type 
E θ  is deterred from hold up in the first arrangement, and the 
IFI offers the first best contract. If reform fails in the first arrangement, the IFI cancels 
lending with probability 
* α . Otherwise, if  ()
2
0 P zq = < , then debt relief uncertainty does 
not sort borrowers.   
 
Assume that  ( ) () ( )
22 1,2 1,2 2, , , ,
II
Bi Vxp Vxpp β ττ τ −< − . If  ( ) 0 P zq = > , then from Bayes 
rule, canceling lending with probability one if reform fails in the first arrangement ensures    
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that qq ≥  , so that the hold up strategy is not played in the second arrangement. Thus, type 
E θ  are screened in the first arrangement since they expect hold up to fail with probability 
one. As a result, the IFI can offer the first best contract in both arrangements. If  
() 0 P zq =< , then the IFI is expected to cancel lending in the first arrangement if reform 
fails with probability 
* α ; and the total probability that hold up will fail in the first 
arrangement is  () 0/ P zq = .  From type 
E θ ’s incentive compatibility constraint, hold up is 
not tried if  ()
2
0 P zq =>. In this case, the IFI can offer the first best contract in the first 
arrangement. If reform fails and the IFI does not  provide debt relief—with probability 
* α --
then qq ≥ , and type 
E θ  are screened in the second arrangement. If instead reforms succeed 
in the first arrangement, and  () 0 P zq = < , then type 
E θ  is not screened in the second 
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